Sticky tradition impedes selection of creative ideas.

Creativity is a driving force for human development and has fascinated scholars for centuries. Surprisingly little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of putting creative ideas into action, however. To shed light on this part of the creative process, we tracked how hand movements unfolded when choosing between either a traditional or a creative use of a given object. Participants could freely decide between both options (Experiment 1, N = 51 adults) or were prompted to select a specific use (Experiment 2, N = 51 adults). Temporal as well as spatial measures of action unfolding revealed behavior to be strongly biased toward traditional options when choosing an available, more creative option eventually. Creative behavior thus comprises two obstacles: not only coming up with new ideas, but also overcoming a lasting bias toward using old ones. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The relation between learning and stimulus-response binding.

Perception and action rely on integrating or binding different features of stimuli and responses. Such bindings are short-lived, but they can be retrieved for a limited amount of time if any of their features is reactivated. This is particularly true for stimulus-response bindings, allowing for flexible recycling of previous action plans. A relation to learning of stimulus-response associations suggests itself, and previous accounts have proposed binding as an initial step of forging associations in long-term memory. The evidence for this claim is surprisingly mixed, however. Here we propose a framework that explains previous failures to detect meaningful relations of binding and learning by highlighting the joint contribution of three variables: (a) decay, (b) the number of repetitions, and (c) the time elapsing between repetitions. Accounting for the interplay of these variables provides a promising blueprint for innovative experimental designs that bridge the gap between immediate bindings on the one hand and lasting associations in memory on the other hand. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Creative thinking does not promote dishonesty.

We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts.

Clinical applications of circulating tumor DNA in central nervous system lymphoma.

Detection and characterization of circulating tumor DNA (ctDNA) in body fluids have the potential to revolutionize management of patients with lymphoma. Minimal access to malignant DNA through a simple blood draw or lumbar puncture is particularly appealing for CNS lymphomas (CNSL), which cannot be easily or repeatedly sampled without invasive surgeries. Profiling of ctDNA provides a real-time snapshot of the genetic composition in patients with CNSL and enables ultrasensitive quantification of lymphoma burden at any given time point during the course of the disease. Here, we broadly review technical challenges of ctDNA identification in CNSL, recent advances of innovative liquid biopsy technologies, potential clinical applications of ctDNA and how it may improve CNSL risk stratification, outcome prediction, and monitoring of measurable residual disease. Finally, we discuss clinical trials and scenarios in which ctDNA could be implemented to guide risk-adapted and personalized treatment decisions.

What is left after an error? Towards a comprehensive account of goal-based binding and retrieval.

The cognitive system readily detects and corrects erroneous actions by establishing episodic bindings between representations of the acted upon stimuli and the intended correct response. If these stimuli are encountered again, they trigger the retrieval of the correct response. Thus, binding and retrieval efficiently pave the way for future success. The current study set out to define the role of the erroneous response itself and explicit feedback for the error during these processes of goal-based binding and retrieval. Two experiments showed robust and similar binding and retrieval effects with and without feedback and pointed towards sustained activation of the unbound, erroneous response. The third experiment confirmed that the erroneous response is more readily available than a neutral alternative. Together, the results demonstrate that episodic binding biases future actions toward success, guided primarily through internal feedback processes, while the erroneous response still leaves detectable traces in human action control.

Post-execution monitoring in dishonesty.

When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response-stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response-stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.

Cognitive load promotes honesty.

In three experiments, we examined the cognitive underpinnings of self-serving dishonesty by manipulating cognitive load under different incentive structures. Participants could increase a financial bonus by misreporting outcomes of private die rolls without any risk of detection. At the same time, they had to remember letter strings of varying length. If honesty is the automatic response tendency and dishonesty is cognitively demanding, lying behavior should be less evident under high cognitive load. This hypothesis was supported by the outcome of two out of three experiments. We further manipulated whether all trials or only one random trial determined payoff to modulate reward adaptation over time (Experiment 2) and whether payoff was framed as a financial gain or loss (Experiment 3). The payoff scheme of one random or all trials did not affect lying behavior and, discordant to earlier research, facing losses instead of gains did not increase lying behavior. Finally, cognitive load and incentive frame interacted significantly, but contrary to our assumption gains increased lying under low cognitive load. While the impact of cognitive load on dishonesty appears to be comparably robust, motivational influences seem to be more elusive than commonly assumed in current theorizing.

Binding and Retrieval of Response Durations: Subtle Evidence for Episodic Processing of Continuous Movement Features.

Re-encountering a stimulus retrieves nominally relevant, categorical response features related to previous action decisions in response to this stimulus. Whether binding and retrieval extend to nominally irrelevant, metric features relating to an actual body movement is unknown, however. In two experiments, we thus tested whether repeating target or distractor stimuli across trials retrieves the irrelevant duration of spatial responses to these stimuli. We found subtle indication of such retrieval by task-relevant target stimuli, suggesting that binding and retrieval also operate on metric features of a motor response. In contrast, there was no sign of binding and retrieval of metric features for distractor stimuli. We discuss these observations regarding the representation of action episodes during action-related decision making and during actual movement initiation and control.

Binding Error-Induced Control States.

Binding and retrieval of stimulus features, response features, and their attentional weighting tune cognitive processing to situational demands. The two mechanisms promote successful actions, especially in situations in which such actions depend on controlled processing. Here we explored binding and retrieval of attentional control states that follow from erroneous actions. By definition, such errors are characterized by insufficient cognitive control but at the same time, error detection has been shown to trigger corresponding adjustments to prevent future failures. We reanalyzed existing datasets and conducted a novel experiment to investigate whether error-induced control states become bound to task-relevant stimuli. Results point towards a binding and retrieval of error-induced control states; however, the effect appears to be less reliable than for binding and retrieval of specific stimulus and response features. We discuss potential implications and alternative interpretations in terms of a mediating impact of error-induced control.

Frankly, My Error, I Don't Give a Damn: Retrieval of Goal-Based but Not Coactivation-Based Bindings after Erroneous Responses.

Previous studies demonstrated binding and retrieval of stimuli and correct responses even for those episodes in which the actual response was wrong (goal-based binding and retrieval). In the current study, we tested whether binding based on a co-activation of stimuli and erroneous responses occurred simultaneously with goal-based binding, which could have been masked by a more efficient retrieval of goal-based bindings in previous studies. In a pre-registered experiment (n = 62), we employed a sequential prime-probe design with a three-choice colour categorisation task. Including three different responses in the task allowed us to conduct separate tests for stimulus-based episodic retrieval of either the correct response (goal-based) or of the actual erroneous response (coactivation-based) after committing an error. Replicating previous findings, our study provides support for goal-based binding of stimuli and correct responses after errors, while showing that there is no independent coactivation-based binding of the erroneous response itself.

Error cancellation.

The human cognitive system houses efficient mechanisms to monitor ongoing actions. Upon detecting an erroneous course of action, these mechanisms are commonly assumed to adjust cognitive processing to mitigate the error's consequences and to prevent future action slips. Here, we demonstrate that error detection has far earlier consequences by feeding back directly onto ongoing motor activity, thus cancelling erroneous movements immediately. We tested this prediction of immediate auto-correction by analysing how the force of correct and erroneous keypress actions evolves over time while controlling for cognitive and biomechanical constraints relating to response time and the peak force of a movement. We conclude that the force profiles are indicative of active cancellation by showing indications of shorter response durations for errors already within the first 100 ms, i.e. between the onset and the peak of the response, a timescale that has previously been related solely to error detection. This effect increased in a late phase of responding, i.e. after response force peaked until its offset, further corroborating that it indeed reflects cancellation efforts instead of consequences of planning or initiating the error.

How to measure post-error slowing: The case of pre-error speeding.

Post-error slowing is one of the most widely employed measures to study cognitive and behavioral consequences of error commission. Several methods have been proposed to quantify the post-error slowing effect, and we discuss two main methods: The traditional method of comparing response times in correct post-error trials to response times of correct trials that follow another correct trial, and a more recent proposal of comparing response times in correct post-error trials to the corresponding correct pre-error trials. Based on thorough re-analyses of two datasets, we argue that the latter method provides an inflated estimate by also capturing the (partially) independent effect of pre-error speeding. We propose two solutions for improving the assessment of human error processing, both of which highlight the importance of distinguishing between initial pre-error speeding and later post-error slowing.

The human cognitive system corrects traces of error commission on the fly.

Human perception and action rely on a fundamental binding mechanism that forges integrated event representations from distributed features. Encountering any one of these features later on can retrieve the whole event, thus expediting cognitive processing. The traditional view on binding confines it to successful action episodes, holding that the human cognitive system does not leverage errors for optimizing corresponding event representations. Here we use sequential analyses of erroneous action episodes to explore whether binding promotes future successful behavior even when actions go awry. Results indicate that the processes leading to binding integrate different aspects of the action episode in a highly efficient and flexible manner to privilege future correct actions and prepare the ground for error-based learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Goal-Based Binding of Irrelevant Stimulus Features for Action Slips.

Binding between representations of stimuli and actions and later retrieval of these compounds provide efficient shortcuts in action control. Recent observations indicate that these mechanisms are not only effective when action episodes go as planned, but they also seem to be at play when actions go awry. Moreover, the human cognitive system even corrects traces of error commission on the fly because it binds the intended but not actually executed response to concurrent task-relevant stimuli, thus enabling retrieval of a correct, but not actually executed response when encountering the stimulus again. However, a plausible alternative interpretation of this finding is that error commission triggers selective strengthening of the instructed stimulus-response mapping instead, thus promoting its efficient application in the future. The experiment presented here makes an unequivocal case for episodic binding and retrieval in erroneous action episodes by showing binding between task-irrelevant stimuli and correct responses.

Design choices: Empirical recommendations for designing two-dimensional finger-tracking experiments.

The continuous tracking of mouse or finger movements has become an increasingly popular research method for investigating cognitive and motivational processes such as decision-making, action-planning, and executive functions. In the present paper, we evaluate and discuss how apparently trivial design choices of researchers may impact participants' behavior and, consequently, a study's results. We first provide a thorough comparison of mouse- and finger-tracking setups on the basis of a Simon task. We then vary a comprehensive set of design factors, including spatial layout, movement extent, time of stimulus onset, size of the target areas, and hit detection in a finger-tracking variant of this task. We explore the impact of these variations on a broad spectrum of movement parameters that are typically used to describe movement trajectories. Based on our findings, we suggest several recommendations for best practice that avoid some of the pitfalls of the methodology. Keeping these recommendations in mind will allow for informed decisions when planning and conducting future tracking experiments.

Situation selection and cognitive conflict: explicit knowledge is necessary for conflict avoidance.

Humans transform their environment in order to regulate their own affect. One way to do so is to avoid situations that come with negative rather than positive affect. This selection might not solely bear on expectations of full-blown emotions, but may also be invoked by anticipating the aversiveness of cognitive conflict, when a situation suggests competing behavioural responses. If cognitive conflict is indeed aversive, it may trigger affect regulation goals, which in turn influence choices of situations depending on the magnitude of conflict they contain. People should prefer actions that produce conflict-free situations to actions that produce conflicting situations. In three experiments, participants had to solve a Stroop task by freely choosing between response keys that were either associated with low-conflict or high-conflict in the subsequent trial. We find that people do not automatically prefer actions associated with conflict-free situations to actions that are associated with conflicting situations. They only do so, when they are explicitly informed about the contingency between action and congruency of an upcoming situation. This suggests that cognitive conflict, at least at the level of a standard conflict task as used here, is insufficient to invoke affect regulation processes.

Proactive control of affective distraction: Experience-based but not expectancy-based.

Unpleasant stimuli disrupt ongoing information processing, even when they are entirely task-irrelevant. We examined whether such affective disturbances can be controlled explicitly and proactively. Specifically, we studied two different mechanisms to induce proactive control: the experience of frequent affective distraction and cueing of upcoming affective distraction. We predicted that both mechanisms would shield the attentional system from affective disturbance. Participants solved a letter classification task while being exposed to neutral or negative distractor pictures. We varied whether the proportion of negative distractors was low or high and whether cues for the upcoming type of distractor valence were informative or uninformative. In three experiments (N = 114), we found support for the notion that experience-based control shields information processing from affective disturbances, whereas distractor valence expectations were not helpful. These data suggest that there is no explicit top-down influence on attentional control settings of affective distraction, just adjustments to the context.

Affective distraction along the flexibility-stability continuum.

This study explored whether conditions that promote flexibility in task processing enhance the detrimental impact of irrelevant negative stimulation on performance. We approached this flexibility from a transient and a sustained perspective, by manipulating whether participants repeated or switched between two tasks in consecutive trials and whether they performed the tasks in separate blocks or randomly mixed. Participants categorised either a letter or the colour of a bar, which were presented close to an irrelevant negative or neutral picture. Performance was worse in the presence of negative rather than neutral pictures. Repeating or switching tasks transiently did not modulate this detrimental impact of affective distraction in three experiments (nExp1 = 32, nExp2 = 32, nExp3 = 64). Attentional capture by negative content did decline in single compared to mixed task contexts, but only when these sustained task contexts also differed in the frequency of affective stimulation. When affective stimulation was the same in mixed and single task contexts, this modulation vanished. Overall, these results suggest that the influence of task-irrelevant negative stimulation on performance is surprisingly independent of cognitive states that favour either flexible or stable processing of task-relevant information.

On the ball: Short-term consequences of movement fakes.

In competitive situations, humans sometimes use fake actions. Fake actions are carried out to pretend a certain action goal, which however is not actually pursued, such as pump fakes in basketball, or drop shots in tennis. Here, we studied the short-term consequences of producing or observing fakes on the planning and detection of subsequent fake actions. Two players participated in a game, an attacker and a defender. Attackers had to either throw a ball into a target basket of the defender, or to mimic such a throw without actually throwing. Defenders had to discriminate between real throws and faked throws. Participants changed the roles of attacker and defender, and switched between real and faked throws randomly, on a trial-by-trial basis. We found that the (self-)observation of a fake action facilitated the detection of subsequent fake actions of opponents, but did not facilitate the subsequent planning of own fake actions. We conjecture that previous encounters of fake actions help to focus on the movement aspects that are most diagnostic for such fake actions. As a potential practical consequence, we recommend to not generate multiple fake actions in sports within a short time, to prevent potential short-term perceptual adaptation effects of defenders.

Conflict modification: predictable production of congruent situations facilitates responding in a stroop task.

Humans cope with cognitive conflict in various ways, such as focusing on task-relevant instead of task-irrelevant information or avoiding situations where conflict is likely. These adaptations to conflict resemble those used to cope with negative affect. We examined whether situation modification, a strategy derived from the extended process model of emotion regulation, may influence responding in cognitive conflict tasks. This should be evident by a facilitation of actions that consistently modify situations towards congruent (positive) situations rather than to incongruent (negative) situations. In four experiments, participants modified stimuli in a color-word Stroop task towards congruent or incongruent stimuli of (un)predictable identity. A modification effect emerged insofar as participants were faster when they foreseeably produced congruent stimuli of predictable identity than when they produced incongruent stimuli or stimuli of unpredictable identity. Our results add to the body of evidence connecting affect and cognitive conflict, and reveal a constraint when using situation modification as a means to regulate cognitive conflict.